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ABSTRACT

Technology tends to evolve over time, leading over things to evolve with it. One example may be
the evolution of weapons with technological advancement. When these weapons change, it
changes how war is conducted. This paper seeks to delve into the specifics of this phenomena.
With technological advancement, the world has seen new threats such as lethal autonomous
weapons (LAWs) and cyber weapons. New weapons have been, at times, too threatening. They
have created so much stigma around themselves the international community ultimately decided
against their use. These weapons may then receive a weapon taboo, discouraging their use. This
paper seeks to analyze whether the aforementioned emerging technology weapons – LAWs and
cyber weapons – may deserve a taboo. The paper will utilize case studies by examining weapons
which were previously given a taboo. By determining why other weapons - specifically chemical
and biological weapons (CBWs) and nuclear weapons - received a taboo, this paper will determine
whether LAWs and cyber weapons also meet the criteria.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to analyze how weapon taboos are established by utilizing norm
evolution theory as well as current weapon taboos. As technology has evolved over time, there
have been changed in how weapons stemming from these technological advancements are
perceived. There is no shortage of research regarding specific weapon taboos and details about
them. However, there seems to be a research gap in why weapons have taboos. As a result, there
is also little research discussing the criteria for weapon taboos and how the criteria may apply to
other existing weapons. Overall, this paper is seeking to identify these criteria and establish how
weapon taboos are created. From there, this paper will analyze emerging technology weapons,
specifically cyber weapons and lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), in order to understand if
they fit the determined criteria.
Cyber weapons were chosen due to their increasing use between states. As cyber
weapons are becoming more prevalent, states must determine how to respond to such actions.
Further, states must determine if this is how they would like to conduct covert actions, or even
warfare. Lethal autonomous weapons were chosen due to their increased use in warfare. As
computer technology has improved over time, it has been easier to utilize and program LAWs,
which track and engage targets with little to no human intervention. As these weapons become
more commonplace for states, it is important to determine whether they should be used in the
future.
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Norm Evolution Theory
As evidenced by its name, norm evolution theory is involved heavily in the idea of norms
in international politics. To discuss norm evolution theory, the theoretical perspective upon
which this paper has its basis, it is important to discuss norms. Scholars of international relations
have an ongoing debate regarding the merit of norms and their impact on international politics.
Many theoretical perspectives exist amongst these scholars, some of which ignore norms, while
others believe they are impactful. This paper is of the belief that norms do have an impact on
international relations, which then may influence how states make decisions. This paper assumes
that norms are the basis of weapon taboos. As norms change regarding particular weapons, a
taboo may come as a result.
Norms
Scholars tend to have slightly differing definitions of norms, but they all still contain the
same idea. Florini, for example, defined norms as “a set of intersubjective understandings readily
apparent to actors that makes behavioral claims on those actors.”1 Still, there exists the question
of how a norm becomes a norm on an international scale. According to Florini, there are two
aspects: that norms are about behavior and that norms provide a “sense of ought.”2 In other
words, norms are not concerned with the beliefs or ideas held by states, but simply by their
behavior. As well as this, the sense of ought determines how an actor should behave. This sense
of ought can be determined by the actor itself or by other actors who may be assessing the
behavior.3 An actor may not conduct certain types of behavior because it is not what they
‘should’ do. On the other hand, another actor may emphasize that the actor’s behavior goes
against what ‘should’ be done. Both would be examples of the enforcement of norms.

2

In international politics, there are two main types of norms: regulative and constitutive.
Regulative norms are those which “order and constrain behavior,” while constitutive norms
create new concepts such as actors or interests.4 This paper will focus on regulative norms to
discuss how norms may impact weapon taboos. This research operates under the assumption that
weapon taboos stem from regulative norms. Regulative norms impact how states behave and
weapon taboos state which weapons can be used by states, therefore impacting how states
behave. Any states who break norms typically are faced with disapproval from other states,
though there are exceptions. The best evidence for norms can be seen in communications from or
between various actors. Finnemore and Sikkink use the United States as evidence for these
communications.5 The United States explained “why it [felt] compelled to continue using land
mines in South Korea,” which demonstrates the United States was aware of a growing norm
against the use of those mines.6 In other words, the United States felt compelled to justify its
behavior because it was aware of norms against those actions. If these norms did not exist or had
no impact, the United States would not have justified its actions in such a way.
One result of regulative norms is how states decide to take actions. Under the influence of
regulative norms, states make decisions based on two factors: the state’s own self-interest and
the norm.7 While states are primarily operating in their own best interest, norms may influence
how they plan to pursue such goals. For example, while the United States seeks to defeat
terrorism for its own self-interest, decisions on how to achieve this goal are impacted by norms.
Specifically, the United States decides upon the type and degree of force used in fighting
terrorism based upon norms.8 In this case, the United States could use conventional methods to
pursue its goal, such as targeting and assassinating a single leader of a terrorist group. However,
the use of nuclear weapons would be an unacceptable method to defeat terrorism, as there is a
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norm against such behavior. One way to describe norms, as stated by Christopher Gelpi, is as
“reputational constraints” on states.9 This means that norms can impact the behavior of states
because they fear a negative impact on their reputations amongst other nations.
Theory
The idea of norm evolution theory is that norms have an evolution over time that
determine the impact these norms have. A norm that was just established is not nearly as
impactful as one which has been generally accepted in the international community. Finnemore
and Sikkink developed a life cycle of norms for their research, consisting of three steps: norm
emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.10 In the first stage, norm emergence, actors
develop the idea of the norm internally. In this case, it is a personal norm with no impact on
other actors. From this point, the actor who created the norm must convince a “critical mass” of
other states to accept the new norm.11 If this fails, the norm will likely have no international
influence. However, once the “critical mass” of states have been convinced, the second stage
begins. The second stage, norm cascade, involves actors socializing with one another, further
spreading the norm. This norm might ‘cascade’ for a variety of reasons, such as “pressure for
conformity” or “desire to enhance international legitimation.”12 The norm will then spread
through the rest of the states to become a commonly held belief. At the end of the cascade, when
the norm is widely accepted, the final stage occurs. The third and final stage, norm
internalization, refers to when the norm is accepted on a broad scale and is “no longer a matter of
broad public debate.”13 At this point, the norm permeates the beliefs of society and impacts how
states behave and interact.
Florini’s interpretation of norm evolution theory compares norms to genes. Florini draws
this analogy on three different levels. First, both genes and norms are both “instructional units”
4

which dictate the behavior of “organisms.”14 In the case of norms, the states serve as the
organisms. Second, norms, like genes, are transferred between individuals via inheritance.15 In
the case of norms, they are transferred through socialization, as described in the norm cascade
process. Finally, norms and genes are both contested, meaning they are “in competition with
other norms that carry incompatible instructions.”16 Norms cannot exist together if they are
incompatible. For example, a norm discouraging the use of nuclear weapons cannot exist at the
same time as a norm encouraging the use of nuclear weapons. As well as this, norms must
compete to determine which are the most culturally relevant. As norms change, so does the
behavior of society. Norm evolution theory is an important tenet in understanding weapon
taboos. How norms evolve and develop over time may dictate how nations view actions from
their peers. Changing norms may mean actions that were acceptable before are now seen as
taboo and frowned upon. In Florini’s research, she states that the success or failure of various
norms is dependent on three factors:
(1) whether a norm becomes prominent enough in the norm pool to gain a foothold; (2)
how well it interacts with other prevailing norms with which it is not in competition, that
is, the "normative environment"; and (3) what external environmental conditions confront
the norm pool.17
This corresponds to the idea of a norm life cycle in some ways. For example, the first
factor is similar to the idea of norm emergence and norm cascade. The norm, upon its
emergence, needs to become prominent enough to reach the cascade point. If it does not do so,
we see the failure of this norm. Further, the second factor indicates that norms are constantly in
competition with one another. Norms compete to become more prominent in the international
forum. As well as this, norms cannot become relevant if they conflict with other existing norms.
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For example, it is unlikely that a norm encouraging the use of nuclear weapons would gain
traction in the current international system. The current norm is simply too popular amongst
nations to change.
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CHAPTER TWO: CURRENT WEAPON TABOOS
This paper is structured upon the use of case studies. This research will look at current
weapon taboos in order to determine why they received a taboo. This analysis will determine
what are the criteria which dictate the establishment of weapon taboos. In the next chapter, the
paper will discuss how the aforementioned emerging technology weapons compare to the criteria
determined in this paper. For the purpose of this research, two current weapon taboos will be
discussed: chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) and nuclear weapons. Both of these
weapons are within the category of weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs. This term dates
back to 1937, when the phrase was used in a London Times article discussing Germany’s use of
aerial bombing.18 The term was adopted by the United Nations in 1947, which defined weapons
of mass destruction as “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical
and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics
comparable in destructive effect.”19 This definition indicates that it is possible for other weapons
to fit the idea of weapons of mass destruction, as long as they fit the criteria. This is, in part, what
this paper seeks to do. Quite simply, this paper seeks to determine if the definition of weapons of
mass destruction should be amended to include the emerging technology weapons to be
discussed.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The first weapon taboo to be discussed is that of chemical and biological weapons, which
will henceforth be referred to as CBWs. Ilchmnn and Revill state that the CBW taboo is actually
“based on an ancient cross cultural taboo against poison and disease used as weapons which have
long been viewed as morally corrupt.”20 In other words, the CBW taboo did not only exist in
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modern times, but relates to more ancient and long-standing beliefs held by society. Still, while
there have been long-standing beliefs against the use of chemical weapons, there have also been
treaties and agreements established. For example, there are three main examples of the taboo
within international law: the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention,
and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.21 Together, these three contribute to prohibit the
development, possession, and use of any CBWs.
Definitions and History
According to Iannotti et al., there have been regulations against chemical weapons on an
international scale since ancient times.22 Of course, these regulations have ebbed and flowed
over time. Chemical weapons can be defined as “each weapon containing chemical substances,
nonliving matters capable of causing consequences against people, animals and plants and
infrastructures.”23 These weapons are incredibly dangerous and exposure can occur through skin
contact or ingestion, among other possibilities. The use of chemical weapons can be seen very
far back in history. For example, in 1000 B.C. chemical weapons were used by the Chinese via
the use of arsenic smoke.24 Further, the Greeks used “a mixture of sulfur and pitch resin to
produce suffocating fumes” during the Trojan War.25 In other words, the world has long known
the effects of using chemical weapon, leading to various regulations for them throughout history.
However, as mentioned previously, these regulations were not continuous. In fact, there
were times where regulations regarding chemical weapons were completely removed or even
useless. An example of this would be after the 1874 Brussels Convention. The Brussels
Convention attempted to control chemical weapons, but there was no clear definition at the
time.26 Therefore, this convention was expanded upon in 1899 with the First Hague Peace
Appeal. This appeal led to agreement stating those nations at the conference would “abstain from
8

the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious
gases.”27 However, these agreements were basically useless at the time. Specifically, these
weapons were not, at the time, being use by any militaries. Therefore, states agreed to the
abstention because it would not actually impact them.28 There would be no need to change any
behavior if states were not participating in such behavior in the first place. To go even further,
during the First Hague Peace Conference, delegates had refused to agree to any proposals that
would limit or eliminate any weapons that were actively being used.29
One of the most well-known examples of the use of chemical weapons would be the use
during the First World War. For example, Germany utilized “canisters of chlorine gas at the
battle of Ypres in Belgium” which “resulted in the deaths of 5,000 French troops and injured
another 15,000.”30 This served as an example of how effective and powerful such weapons could
be when utilized in war. As such, both sides of the war started to increase the use of such
weapons and developed more varieties. Ultimately, the war was faced with the use of mustard
gas, which could “[burn] the skin and lungs.”31 Statistically, the gas led to nearly 100,000 deaths
and around 1.2 million injuries. In total, it is estimated that “124,000 tons of chemicals were used
in the war.”32 Still, the use of mustard gas is recognized as “ineffective as a military weapon” as
its effects on both soldiers and civilians alike caused a “loss of support for war effects and
retaliation.”33 This is, in part, what led to the signing of the Geneva Protocol.
Finally, a modern example of chemical weapons usage is from Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad. As a result of al-Assad’s actions, states have been clear regarding their distaste and
disapproval. For example, the United States made it clear that “any employment of such
weaponry by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would constitute an intolerable and illegitimate
act” and would lead to a shift in U.S. policy toward the Syrian conflict as a whole.34 Still, this
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begs one very particular question. While there are so many ongoing tragedies in the world, many
of which are ignored or unnoticed, the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime required
some amount of interventionism. Why is this the case? According to Bentley, the answer is fairly
simple: the current weapon taboo leads to nations feeling the need to stand up against the use and
employment of CBWs.35 In other word, norms dictating the views on CBWs leads nations to feel
uncomfortable with the idea of these weapons being used on an international scale. More
specifically, CBWs can be classified as a weapon “whose employment so exceeds the limitations
of acceptability that [its] avoidance and proscription are deemed essential.”36 This exemplifies
some modern views on the CBW taboo.
Biological weapons, on the other hand, are defined as “the use of a bacteria, virus, or
other biological pathogen to attack or deliberately infect people, livestock, or crops.”37 Overall,
these are less commonly used than chemical weapons, but still have a long history, which may
even date back to 184 B.C.E. In this early example, Hannibal of Carthage conducted this form of
warfare by hurling “pots containing vipers onto the decks of enemy ships.”38 Another example
occurred in 1495, the Spanish conducted biological warfare by spiking wine “with the blood of
leprosy patients” and giving the wine to their French enemies.39 Overall, however, these early
attempts at biological warfare tended to be unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it still effective
demonstrates the history of the concept dates back thousands of years.
There are even examples of biological warfare within the United States itself. Delivering
smallpox blankets to enemies had been utilized at least twice in American history. First, British
officers planned to give smallpox blankets to Native Americans in 1763. Also, Luke Blackburn
of Kentucky “sold blankets contaminated with smallpox and yellow fever to Union troops”
during the American Civil War.40 There are also more recent examples of the United States being
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accused of biological warfare. This example also emphasizes that biological weapons are not
solely used to target humans but can also impact crops or livestock. In the time period of 1962 to
1996, Cuban officials “accused the United States 21 times of attempting to use biological
weapons,” including “the use of Newcastle disease against poultry” or “African swine fever
aimed at pigs.”41 Overall, biological weapons do have a long history of use which still occurs
even in modern times, but they are still much less common in use than chemical weapons.
Reasons Behind the Taboo
After discussing the definition and history of CBWs, it is important to discuss why these
weapons have a stigma and a taboo against their use. Also included in this section will be a
discussion on the aforementioned conventions and regulations against CBWs. For example, the
1925 Geneva Protocol came as a result to the response to CBW use in World War I. Specifically,
it prohibits the “use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous
liquids, materials, or devices,” as well as “bacteriological methods of warfare.”42 In other words,
this protocol was made to prohibit the use of CBWs. It was aimed at expanding upon what was
established in the 1899 Hague Appeal. However, it is important to note that the agreement
included in this agreement was one prohibiting first-use of such weapons, but did not prohibit
their use in the context of reciprocity.43 This was a condition upon which many states agreed to
sign this protocol. Over time, however, this agreement has become so widely accepted that all
states are expected to follow, not just those who originally signed.44 Further, there were other
places in which this agreement was lacking. For example, this agreement stated that only the use
of the CBWs were prohibited but did not say the same regarding transferring or producing these
weapons.45 Further, states were not required to destroy any existing stockpiles of weapons.46
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Further, the other two previously mentioned agreements are the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention, or BWC, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC. The
1972 BWC states that using biological weapons “would be repugnant to the conscience of
mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk.”47 As well as this, it is
important to discuss how, exactly, this agreement was worded and what this wording means. For
example, the convention puts emphasis on the quantity. Article I of the BWC prohibits the use of
biological agents “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes.”48 This is important as it means that this convention is unlikely to
become obsolete over time. This statement is general enough in nature, and does not limit itself
to naming specific biological agents, in order to ensure that the evolution of science does not
make the agreement outdated.
Finally, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention also has a general purpose criterion,
similar to the BWC. This general purpose criterion is also meant to be general enough that the
agreement will remain relevant over time. Also, this agreement also includes obligations
“prohibiting the transfer of chemical weapons” and “detailed requirements for national
implementation.”49 However, it is important to mention that this agreement does contain a list of
specific chemicals, but most of the agreement is based on prohibiting uses of chemicals, meaning
it still has general use. Also, there are exceptions within the CWC in which chemicals can be
used against humans. One example of this is that law enforcement can use chemicals in order to
control domestic riots, but they must be agents that “can produce rapidly in humans sensory
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination
of exposure.”50 This agreement is similar to the BWC, but also provides some very specific cases
and examples.
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Finally, there are reasons that the general, international opinion on CBWs changed over
time, leading to the taboo and agreements against them. One reason is simply the cruelty and
damage that chemical weapons may cause. As well as this, the use of chemical weapons is
indiscriminate in its damage.51 When a chemical weapon is deployed, there is no way to tell it to
only harm the enemies. Instead, civilians may also face significant harm in this. Overall, CBWs
are seen as “insidious, unseen, and secretive” as they can be used with little warning and can
cause such harm.52 Still, the question becomes why are CBWs seen so negatively when a normal
bomb can also indiscriminately harm civilians and enemies alike? One reason may be that the
idea of choking on a poisonous gas may be viewed as a slower, more painful death than a bomb
being dropped. As well as this, Michael Mandelbaum argues that “the aversion to chemical
weapons may be deeply rooted in human chromosomes.”53 This relates back to the idea
presented at the beginning of this chapter: the chemical weapons taboo and the cultural aversion
to such weapons has a long-standing and deep-rooted history within us. As well as this, CBWs
have an association with poison, which may provide justification for their prohibition. For
example, robust calls for the prohibition against the use of poison as weapon dates back to 1589,
when Alberico Gentili called for the weapon’s ban.54 This means, however, that the association
with poison is not as historical and does not date back to ancient times, but rather only several
hundred years. A 1625 treatise written by Grotius provides insight into why this agreement
against poison weapons came to be. To put it simply, poison, similar to CBWs, was
indiscriminate in its damage. As such, while royalty was typically safe from being killed on the
battlefield by the common soldier, they were not nearly as safe from being the victims of
poison.55 Therefore, royalty discouraged the use of poison for their own protection, opting for the
more conventional war methods.
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Nuclear Weapons
The nuclear weapons taboo is the second of the current weapon taboos to be discussed
within this research. Unlike CBWs, it is unlikely that humans have some deep-rooted historical
aversion to their use, eventually leading to the taboo. In fact, nuclear weapons were widely
accepted for some time, and many believed they would become commonplace in wars. For
example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles once stated that he believed in the “ultimate
inevitability” that nuclear weapons would become “conventional.”56 Still, nuclear weapons have
become taboo and are altogether avoided in use in war. It is important to note that the revulsion
toward nuclear weapons does not only apply to the big bombs, but rather to all forms of nuclear
weaponry. As such, the versions of nuclear bombs that policymakers such as John Foster Dulles
thought could become conventional, such as “tactical battlefield uses in limited wars,” are no
longer plausible.57 This begs the question of how this change in opinion came to be.
Definitions and History
To put it simply, nuclear weapons “can be constructed from highly enriched uranium or
plutonium.”58 Nuclear weapons are not very difficult to make and require a small amount of
nuclear material to function. If a state, or even a non-state group, were to acquire the materials
necessary for the weapon, it would not be difficult to construct it. Overall, the most difficult step
in the process would be acquiring any and all components, as these components tend to be highly
regulated on an international scale. As well as this, some states may be considered ‘rogue states,’
as they have nuclear weapon capability and may sell this information on the black market. The
most notable of these states are North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.59 For example, it is possible that
North Korea could sell the materials to create nuclear weapons, or the weapons themselves, on
the black market in order to raise funds or harm their enemies.60 Pakistan, on the other hand, has
14

a history of sharing the knowledge of nuclear weaponry. For example, Abdul Qadeer Khan, an
engineer of the Pakistani nuclear program, admitted in 2004 that nuclear technology and
equipment had been given to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.61 It has been alleged that even the
Pakistani President was aware of such interactions and transactions. As such, there is still an
underlying fear that these rogue states may share their knowledge with other enemies or even
non-state groups, such as terrorist groups.
Still, it is essential to understand how these weapons came to be viewed as taboo. The
origins of this taboo date back to August 6, 1945, the day the United States dropped the first
atomic bomb on Japan. At the time of the bomb being dropped, nuclear weapons were accepted
on an international scale as a perfectly valid weapon of war.62 After Hiroshima and Nagaski, the
horrifying and destructive powers of the nuclear bomb were clear, but this did not mean there
was an immediate change in attitude. In fact, the United States crafted military policies including
and relying on nuclear weapons beginning in 1948.63
As well as this, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki developed debate within
themselves regarding whether nuclear bombs should have been used at all. While it is typically
viewed that the bombs were necessary to “save American lives and to end the war decisively,”
some scholars feel that the bomb was unnecessary.64 In this belief, it is stated that the United
States simply used to end the war quickly, but it was not necessary to do so. For example, the US
Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan would have most likely “surrendered before
November 1, 1945 even without the bomb, Soviet entry into the war, or an invasion of the
Japanese islands.”65 Therefore, it is likely that dropping the bomb was entirely unnecessary.
Even advisors such as General Dwight Eisenhower and chief of staff William D. Leahy told
Truman utilizing the bomb was unnecessary.66 Still, it is important to note that even if the bomb
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was unnecessary, there was no other reason to not use the bomb. There were no moral issues
with using the bomb. Further, the course of World War II led to a connection being made
between nuclear and conventional bombing. Nuclear weapons were seen as a more effective way
to carry out conventional bombing strategies, and for leaders “it was not thought that any
irreversible threshold had been crossed.”67 In other words, it was not viewed that nuclear
weapons were any worse than the already acceptable strategic bombing practices. Over the
course of the war, there was a “general erosion of moral restraints” that meant that may practices
were accepted, even strategically bombing cities and harming civilians. As such, it was unlikely
for there to be moral qualms against the use of a nuclear weapon.
Ultimately, the use of the nuclear bomb in World War II led to two competing views. The
first view stated that the atomic bomb was successful in its use and may be used more in the
future. The U.S. Air Force was a clear example of this view, as they intended to use atomic
bombs to drop on enemy cities commonly in war.68 It would be no different than what had been
done in Japan and the Air Force saw no issue with it. On the other hand, others viewed that
nuclear weapons would meet the same fate of chemical weapons, where they would be used in
one war and then discouraged in the next. Atomic scientists wrote in the Franck report of June
1945 that atomic bombs would most likely not be used after World War II because “public
opinion would disapprove.”69 This became a bigger concern as the aftermath of the Japan
bombings came to light. When reports of deaths from radiation surfaced, there were concerns
that atomic bombs would be compared to the poison gas from chemical weapons.70 This marks
the beginning of concerns regarding nuclear weapons and the origins of the taboo.
Concerns over the use of nuclear weapon continued to grow over the next few decades. In
the late 1950s, groups would protest the testing of nuclear bombs. It was even a topic of the 1956
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US presidential election as Adlai Stevenson had included a test ban in his platform.71 As well as
this, distaste for nuclear testing was becoming more popular amongst the general public. For
example, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was created in 1957 by
Norman Cousins, an editor for the Saturday Review. By the following year, the group had
reached 25,00 members.72 This is, however, only one example of the various groups which
advocated against nuclear testing at this time. Ultimately, the nuclear taboo began to be formally
established in the early 1960s via various arms control agreements. American policy at the time
also began to shift more toward nuclear arms control, especially due to the ongoing arms race
with the USSR.73 Overall, the US held the view that nuclear weapons were to exist for the
purpose of deterrence, rather than used in war.
There were several factors aided in institutionalizing the nuclear taboo on an international
scale. First, the nuclear arms race made it clear that, if remained unchecked, nuclear war was
possible and would be incredibly destructive.74 Therefore, it was necessary to place some
limitations on their use. Quite simply, both the US and the USSR realized that a lack of arms
controls on nuclear weapons would only cause grand destruction on an international scale,
especially following the alarm of the Cuban missile crisis. Second, the expansion in countries
who had nuclear weapons was cause for concern. Over the past several decades, other nations
had established their nuclear arsenal. For example, Britain had tested “its first weapon in 1952
and its first thermonuclear weapon in 1957” and France tested “its first nuclear weapon in
1960.”75 As more nations developed nuclear weapons, fear of a world armed with nuclear
arsenals became a larger concern. Third, developing nations began to demand arms control
agreements as they gained a voice in the United Nations.76 Many of the treaties to be negotiated
on a larger scale depended upon smaller states, which did not possess nuclear weapons, to
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succeed. This meant that smaller, developing nations became important players in these issues,
more so than these nations usually would be.
The first examples of legal limitations on using nuclear weapons came to fruition in
nuclear-weapons-free-zones. These zones were designed to limit “possession, testing,
deployment, and use of nuclear weapons on a geographic basis.”77 Typically, these were
established by non-nuclear states in these areas who did not want to be faced with the
consequences of a Cold War they were not involved in. In the end, however, these zones
succeeded in making “much of the planet off-limits to the use of nuclear weapons.”78 The
nuclear-weapons-free-zone in Latin America was the first zone established in a populated area,
as its predecessor was Antarctica. This was also the first ever non-use agreement.79 The creation
of this zone came as a result of the Cuban missile crisis. Nations in the area felt fear they would
be unwillingly dragged into the nuclear conflict between the US and the USSR. Consequently,
the Treaty of Tlatelolco was created and agreed to in 1967 to establish a nuclear-weapons-freezone.80
Another example of the codification of the nuclear taboo is the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. This treaty established a formal presumption of non-use of nuclear
weapons between the two powers.81 In other words, both sides were agreeing to utilize nuclear
weapons in the context of deterrence rather than using them in war. As well as this, this treaty
included the idea that “the two countries… would not deploy anti-ballistic-missile systems to
defend their terrorities against a nuclear attack,” meaning that they were confident neither nation
would use their nuclear arsenals.82 According to Tannenwald, the ABM treaty had two effects.
The first was the explicit regulative effect of banning ABMS, but there was also a secondary
effect. The secondary effect was a constitutive effect, which was made to “codify and legitimize
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deterrence… as the appropriate role for superpower nuclear weapons.”83 This agreement
exemplifies that the nuclear taboo was in effect at this point. Nations wanted to avoid actual use
of nuclear weapons in war. Instead, nuclear weapons were meant to exist as a threat and a
message to other nations. This message was that any attacks against them may result in nuclear
war.
Reasons Behind the Taboo
There are several reasons that explain the development of the nuclear taboo over time.
Some of these reasons can even be compared to those of the CBW taboo. However, the nuclear
weapon taboo is still unique in its development. For example, the politics of the Cold War and
the interests of world superpowers did play a role in the development of the taboo, but they were
not the only factor by any means.84 As mentioned previously, some other factors included the
various peace groups that developed. These peace groups were resistant to the idea of nuclear
weapons and nuclear testing. This was another factor that pushed toward the establishment of a
taboo. Further, small, non-nuclear states attempted to encourage a taboo on the weapon by
utilizing their collective power in the United Nations to call for actions and arms control.85 The
idea of power politics and small nations rising against the weapons did not occur in the lead up to
the chemical weapon ban. These factors are unique to the nuclear ban and its conception. On the
other hand, the main similarity with the CBW taboo is that both were, at least in part, by a strong
moral component. For the nuclear taboo, nuclear weapons are viewed to “flagrantly violate longstanding moral principles of discrimination and proportionality in the use of force.”86 Similar to
CBWs, nuclear weapons are not discriminatory on whom they harm. If a nuclear weapon is
dropped on a city, it does not only impact the combatants. However, it is a common view that it
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is wrong and immoral to harm innocents in a war. This leads to nuclear weapons themselves to
be viewed as immoral due to their destructive nature.
Criteria for a Weapon Taboo
There is not an exact, written list anywhere that establishes criteria for a weapon to have
a taboo. As well as this, there are no values for these criteria. They are simply qualitative in
nature. Nonetheless, this paper seeks to establish its own criteria based on research on current
weapon taboos. This section will reiterate and analyze the factors which led to taboos being
placed upon CBWs and nuclear weapons. These criteria will be further analyzed in the next
chapter to determine if the emerging technology weapons match this criteria.
A Moral Quandary
The clearest criteria, evident in both the nuclear taboo and the CBW taboo, is the moral
aspect of their use. The main concern with these weapons is the destruction they cause in their
use. As mentioned previously, neither nuclear weapons nor CBWs are discriminatory in their
harm. Therefore, it is clear that these weapons are of concern because they may harm innocent
people. While there is also a supposed genetic basis for the aversion to CBWs, some scholars
state that the norm is still heavily based on poisons being viewed as “inappropriate weapon of
war.”87 In other words, the genetic basis may have some factor, but poisons – and thus CBWs –
were also just viewed as unacceptable weapons. This is, in part, due to their subtle and almost
undetectable nature. Therefore, the CBW taboo has some basis in morality, as the weapons were
generally viewed as immoral and inappropriate.
Nuclear weapons, especially when they were first developed, are incredibly destructive
weapons. As well as this, nuclear weapons leave behind nuclear fallout, which can have its own
consequences. The first nuclear weapon tested was able to create an explosion “equivalent to the
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detonation of approximately 20,000 tons of TNT.”88 These weapons only became more
destructive and powerful over time. The norms against nuclear weapons developed rather
quickly after their first use in Japan. These norms even led to President Truman rejecting their
use against the Chinese in the Korean War.89 This exemplifies that the norm, even before it was
institutionalized, had a profound impact on policy decisions.
Still, there were officials who expressed concern with the employment of nuclear
weapons even before the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. For example, General George
Marshall stated that nuclear weapons should only be used against military targets. If civilians
would be present where the weapon was targeting, advanced notice should be provided.90
Admiral Leahy, on the other hand, went a step further in his beliefs. He did not believe nuclear
weapons were to be used at all. To support his point, he compared nuclear weapons to chemical
weapons.91 Nonetheless, these views were uncommon and were in the minority at the time.
Peace-seeking group, no matter their motivation, ultimately led to the development of the nuclear
norm. For example, the Soviet-led World Peace Council approved the Stockholm Peace Appeal
in 1950, calling for a ban on nuclear weapons.92 This signified a change in the nuclear norm
because of how nuclear weapons were framed. As well as this, this appeal was popularized
around the world, with hundreds of millions of signers. This petition called for “outlawing of
atomic weapons as instruments of intimidation and mass murder of peoples.”93 It also stated that
any government who uses the weapons first against another nation would be “committing a
crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal.”94 This appeal provided a
harsh, but popular, view on the horrors of nuclear weapons, supported by an incredibly large
number of people. Peace-seeking groups, such as the World Peace Council, began to popularize
views that nuclear weapons were heinous and immoral to bring into war.
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Overall, the conclusion to be made is that both CBWs and nuclear weapons are viewed
on a grand scale as immoral and therefore unusable in war. As such, it can be concluded that one
factor to receiving a weapon taboo is the morality of the weapon. If a weapon is viewed as
immoral and extremely destructive, it is likely to receive a weapon taboo. One thing to consider
when discussing morality is how the weapon may impact civilians. CBWs and nuclear weapons,
for example, have been known to cause harm to civilians. Nuclear fallout from the use of nuclear
weapons is, most likely, unavoidable. Therefore, the consequences of using such a weapon
would most likely harm innocent civilians in a war. Still, this is not the only factor which may
lead to a weapon taboo, as to be discussed in the next section.
Politics and Power as an Influence
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the geopolitics of the Cold War era had influence on
the development of the nuclear taboo. Though not as powerful, politics did also influence the
CBW taboo as well. This section will discuss how politics and power have played a role in the
development of taboos. In the section discussing CBWs and the corresponding taboo, selfinterest did play a part in the taboo. This was more common centuries before the modern CBW
taboo. As mentioned previously, Grotius published writing discussing how the power of the
kings influenced a historical taboo against poison weapons. Kings pushed for this norm because
they could not be protected from poison weapons, while they could be protected – to some extent
– from soldiers.95 Still, this is an early example and does not completely apply to the modern
CBW taboo.
The influence of power politics is more evident in the nuclear weapon taboo. The nuclear
taboo was in development during the Cold War period, in which two global superpowers were
locked in standoff. Ultimately, discouraging and banning the use of nuclear weapons would be
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beneficial to both, as the threat of nuclear war would diminish. In 1945, the United States – still
the only state to possess nuclear weapons at the time – advocated for control over nuclear
weapons via the Baruch Plan. The Baruch Plan was an agreement between the United States,
Britain, and Canada for the United States to give up all nuclear weapons, so long as “all other
nations agreed not to pursue them.”96 This plan ultimately failed, however, as the Soviet Union
rejected it. This does not mean the Soviet Union had no interest in advocating against nuclear
weapons, the nation just did not agree with the Baruch Plan. On its own, the Soviet Union led
anti-nuclear efforts, such as joining the United States to establish the UN Atomic Energy
Commission, which had the goal of eliminating “national armaments of atomic weapons.”97 This
is just one example of Soviet anti-nuclear efforts, but it is important to note the motivation
behind these efforts. Simply, similar to the United States, the Soviet Union pursued these
avenues in order to gain an advantage in the Cold War. These efforts, according to Mazanex,
were “largely intended to delegitimize U.S. nuclear weapons (despite the Soviets themselves
acquiring such weapons in 1949).”98 In other words, both the United States and the Soviet
Unions were major advocates for constraints on nuclear weapons. While these actions were in
part motivated by the morality of the use of such weapons, the power politics of the ongoing
Cold War conflict also played a role.
Power and politics can play a role in the development in norms and taboos. If powerful,
influential states feel strongly about weapons, they may seek to remove it. This was very evident
in the development of the nuclear taboo and was also played a role, albeit smaller, in the CBW
taboo as well. Therefore, it is possible that emerging technology weapons may be advocated
against in the future if states were to feel it would benefit them. This next chapter will discuss
these weapons and why they may be pursued for a taboo.
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CHAPTER THREE: EMERGING TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS
This section seeks to analyze two emerging technology weapons: cyber weapons and
lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs). This chapter will discuss the history and characteristics of
these weapons in order for them to be compared to the previously established criteria in the
following chapter. These weapons were chosen because they are becoming increasingly
prevalent in conflicts today. Evolving technology has led to changes in the landscape of war and
conflicts. As these forms of conflict become more utilized, it is essential to understand how they
impact how states will interact going forward.
Cyber Weapons
Technology and its evolution has greatly changed how the individual and the collective
functions on a day-to-day basis. Technological advancement is responsible for 60 to 85 percent
of economic growth today.99 It is difficult to understate just how impactful technology has been
today. Still, this advancement does not only provide benefits, it also has emboldened threats. A
1991 US National Research Council study stated that “Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do
more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.”100 This served as an early warning on the
threat of cyberweapons and thus the need for cybersecurity preparedness. While this was a
concern 30 years ago, it is even more prevalent now. The world is now deeply interconnected
with computers and the internet, meaning that cyber attacks can be even more devastating. These
attacks could harm economic growth or national security, for example.101 As well as this, cyber
warfare enables asymmetrical warfare. While larger and more powerful states may have great
cyber capabilities, they may also have more vulnerabilities to be exploited by their enemies.102
Cyber warfare is not exclusive to conflicts between states, non-state actors such as terrorist
groups could also be the culprit. Evidence of this can be seen via WikiLeaks, Anonymous, and
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LulzSec, which can have comparable influence to a state in the cyber realm.103 The same can be
said of weapons such as CBWs or nuclear weapons. It is not impossible for a terrorist group to
gather the materials required to create a nuclear weapon. However, it is much simpler to utilize a
computer in conflict, especially for a non-state actor. For example, Admiral Mike McConnel
states “Sooner or later, terror groups will achieve cyber-sophistications. It’s like nuclear
proliferation, only far easier.”104 As such, cyber warfare may be a terrorist’s method of choice for
this reason. Cyberwarfare can be defined as:
the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
enemy computers and computer networks, or the computer and networks themselves.105
Overall, there are limited examples of cyber warfare today. In fact, Thomas Ridd even
asserts that “true cyber warfare has not yet occurred.”106 Even if examples are limited, they are
still existent. For example, various Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attacks were
committed against Estonia in mid 2007. This is the “first time a sophisticated cyber attack had
been conducted against a nation-state.”107 Further, Russia has been known to commit cyber
attacks alongside traditional military action. One example of this occurred in 2008 against the
nation of Georgia. While Russia invaded the nation with traditional military forces, it also
committed a cyber attack against Georgia’s digital infrastructure.108 Finally, one of the most
common examples of a cyber attack is the Stuxnet virus. Stuxnet was a worm which impacted
the uranium enrichment program in Iran.109 The worm went undetected for a period of time,
ultimately leading to 1,000 centrifuges to crash. This worm was intended to slow down and
impede the Iranian nuclear program.
Cyber warfare has led to its own arms race between nations, similar to that of the nuclear
age. Cyber warfare has led to “a frenzied contest to develop cyber offensive weapons and devise
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new strategies to defend against them.”110 Various agreements are typically the solution to arms
races, as evidenced by the nuclear arms race. However, any attempts to create such a treaty for
the cyber realm have been rejected by international leaders.111 Nations are instead relying on
building up their own digital arsenals. In many cases, cyber weapons are treated similarly to
nuclear weapons in that both are created in the name of deterrence. In other words, while there is
some focus on cyber security and defense, nations are operating under the idea that strong,
offensive capabilities are the best defense overall.
Research into the field of cyber warfare often leads to scholarly articles comparing cyber
weapons to other weapons. As just mentioned, many scholars find that nuclear weapons and
cyber weapons can be comparable. The biggest comparison between the two would be the idea
of deterrence. In both weapons, deterrence is not a simple issue. In the case of nuclear weapons,
second-strike capabilities are simple against large nuclear attacks. However, deterrence and
retaliation become more difficult against lower-priority attacks.112 As such, deterrence cannot
rely solely on retaliation, but must be supplemented with other features such as conventional
military action. On the other hand, the issue with cyber deterrence is attribution.113 Many cyber
actions may be covert or difficult to trace, meaning it is also difficult to retaliate. As well as this,
the entanglement and interdependence of various states has led to difficulties. For example,
China would also be harmed by a cyber attack which impacted the American economy.114 As
such, this emphasizes the need for robust cyber security. Retaliation cannot be the only answer to
respond to cyber attacks, just as it was an inadequate response to the nuclear threat.
Lethal Autonomous Weapons
The next emerging technology weapon to be discussed are lethal autonomous weapons
(LAWs). As evidenced by the name, these weapons work autonomously and with little to no
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human intervention. In fact, these weapons work in such a way that “once activated, can select
and engage targets without further human intervention.”115 In other words, these systems are
typically programmed to target certain places or people. Once they have been given this task, the
LAW can operate autonomously to complete it with no further action on the part of a human.
The weapon can find the target they are programmed to by “searching and identifying targets
within a set of preprogrammed parameters based on sensor input.”116 The main concern with
LAWs, however, is not the state they are in now. Instead, concerns with LAWs are preemptive
and deal with what these weapons may become. Particularly, scholars fear what will happen as
humans become less and less involved in the weapons. Currently, humans are still ‘in the loop’
with these weapons, having manual control over the drones. However, in the future, humans are
expected to be ‘on the loop,’ meaning that they will just oversee the mission, with the ability to
override decisions. Even more concerning to scholars is the idea that humans may become ‘out
of the loop,’ meaning they will be completely uninvolved with these weapons aside from the
initial programming.117 This brings concerns to many who fear what may happen if such an
autonomous weapon were to malfunction or if the programming is in some way flawed. The
question becomes of what damage could occur.
There is also a question of how LAWs fit into the current international dynamic and into
the current landscape of warfare. International figures and scholars question whether the
utilization of autonomous weapons should be allowed or can be justified for use in warfare. At
this time, LAWs are utilized and are allowed in warfare, but some states are unsure about this.
For example, LAWs have been debated on an international scale, specifically in the context of
the UN’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). This debate demonstrated that
states are facing disagreement on this subject.118 States are unsure about whether these weapons
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should be allowed in war. Some are more hesitant, while others do not see an issue with the
inclusion of such weapons. Even within this debate there are issues. For example, the CCW has
functioned by “regulating the use of weapons, rather than through banning technologies.”119
However, this brings its own issue to light. There is no clear cut way to describe a LAW, and
states disagree on the weapon’s characteristics. States could not reach an agreement on what
constitutes autonomy in this weapon, as well as what could constitute “meaningful influence”
over the weapon.120 Such disagreements demonstrate there is a fundamental issue in the debate.
It is difficult to regulate a weapon which no one can agree on. This may also lead to various
loopholes in any possible agreements. States believe that LAWs should meet the requirements of
the Geneva Convention, just as all other weapons must. This, however, begs the question of
whether these weapons can do so. In order to meet these requirements, LAWs must meet three
criteria: “the capability to distinguish between civilians and combatants, proportionality in the
use of violence, and the personal responsibility of the person in charge of a mission.”121
However, officials believe that it would be impossible to program these weapons to meet these
requirements. As such, it can be concluded that these officials feel that lethal autonomous
weapons should not be utilized in warfare. Further, these officials also feel that the weapons
cannot be morally justified, as machines “should never have the last word over matters of human
life and death.”122 Still, the biggest concern on lethal autonomous weapons seems to be whether
than can be regulated. As well as this, it is uncertain whether LAWs can be classified alongside
other weapons due to the plethora of disagreements over their very nature. Analysis of these
weapons is incredibly difficult with such ongoing debate on even the characteristics of this
weapon.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed current weapon taboos and established criteria based on them. It
has also analyzed emerging technology weapons in order to determine if and how these weapons
might fit into the established criteria. To reiterate, this research has asserted that the main criteria
for weapon taboos are the morality of the weapon’s usage and whether nations of power may
benefit from its regulation. Nuclear weapons were seen as immoral due to the disastrous
consequences of their use. As well as this, powerful nations such as the United States and the
Soviet Union advocated against these weapons for their own gain. Chemical weapons were
viewed as immoral due to their relation to the long-standing poison taboo. As well as this, the
poison taboo has roots in power and politics as powerful members of society wanted to remove
poison weapons for their own protection.
In the case of cyber weapons, this paper feels that there could be a strong case for the
establishment of a taboo. Cyber weapons have been compared to current weapon taboos in much
research, especially nuclear weapons. However, this is not enough to create a taboo by any
means. Cyber weapons are not wholly immoral by any means, but can be immoral if left
unchecked. Particularly, the possibility of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure is a main
concern. Morality, in the case of the current weapon taboos, was based heavily on whether the
weapons could greatly harm civilians. Nuclear fallout and chemical reactions could harm
civilians, leaving them to die in a horrid way. If critical infrastructure was to be attacked by any
actor, there could be substantial impacts.123 One possibility is the death of many individuals due
to a lack of power, such as those who require power to breathe via oxygen tanks or those who are
kept alive via machines in hospitals. However, the main concern about cyber weapons is the idea
that nations of power may seek regulation. Overall, critical infrastructure attacks could be
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disastrous, but are unlikely to occur. Nations, on the other hand, are constantly impacted by
cyber attacks. As mentioned earlier, many nations are incredibly interconnected at this time and
may be harmed if another nation were to be attacked. As such, this paper feels it is likely that
states will seek to regulate cyber operations in the future in order to protect their own self
interests, such as the welfare of their economy. While a weapon taboo may be appropriate based
on the criteria established, there is one concern with the idea of a cyber taboo. As mentioned
earlier, attribution is an issue regarding cyber warfare. It is difficult to determine who is
responsible for many cyber actions. As such, creating a taboo may be possible, but enforcing it
may not be. How can a state face punishment for their actions if it is difficult to prove that state
did anything? In other words, while a cyber taboo does fit the criteria for a taboo, a taboo may
not be practical.
Lethal autonomous weapons, however, are more uncertain. This paper concludes that it is
difficult to determine whether a taboo should be applied on these weapons as there is such
fundamental disagreement on the weapons. In particular, this paper feels that it is difficult to
regulate weapons whose very nature and characteristics are debated. Still, LAWs should be kept
under watch by all nations. As LAWs become more common in warfare and are developed more
thoroughly, it may be easier to determine how they fit into current standards, such as the Geneva
Convention. As well as this, analysis and research into these weapons brings up the concern of
the weapon’s morality, even if there is no certain conclusion. It may be immoral to leave such
difficult decisions, such as whether individuals should live or die, into the hands of technology.
While this may make war easier between nations, a slippery slope could occur. There are also
concerns on what may happen if these weapons were to malfunction. These are issues to pay
attention to in the years to come, when answers may be found.
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One topic this paper does not explore is the idea of norm reversal. Just as a norm can be
created and developed over time, circumstances may change and lead to a norm becoming
irrelevant. More research could be done in the future on this topic and how it may impact the
existence of weapon taboos. Further research could also be conducted on what happens if a
weapon taboo is removed. As well as this, it brings up the question of what may lead to a taboo
being reversed. I would love to explore these topics in future research as I did not get the chance
to delve into them in the topic of this research.
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